Chapter 3.9. What was it?

           Now we can get back already to issues, defined in Chapter 3.3. Let’s enumerate them in ascending order of complexity:  

           - Which forces (units, formations, aircrafts) of German and Finnish bombing aviation were based at airfields in Finland?

           - Which military actions against Soviet Union had this aircraft grouping done in the period of June 22-24, 1941? Which actions were planned by enemy’s command for the coming days and weeks? 

           - What was the real scope of danger, created by enemy’s aircraft grouping in Finland, in comparison with both other threats for Leningrad and capacities of AA defense in Leningrad, aircraft destroyers of North front and Baltic navy of Order of Red Banner?

           - What would be a direct impact of aircraft strike of Soviet AF on Finland (casualties of the parties, correction of parties’ plans)

           - What did Soviet command, Soviet intelligence know about the position of enemy’s aircraft units in Finland, about its actions and plans?

           - What was the real cause of adopting on June 24, 1941 decision on airstrike of Finland, what were the real goals and tasks of this operation? 

           - What was the impact of airstrike on June 25 on the overall tide of the war between Soviet Union against Germany and its allies? 

          We’ll try to give an answer to the last one of these questions in the next Chapter of this book . As for the group of four first questions, the real facts and pretty reliable documents, identified and described in the previous chapters, allow to give irrefragable answers.

           There were 2 flights of long-distance aircraft surveillance (in total 6 aircrafts) on the territory of Finland (airfields of Rovaniemi and Luonetyarvi), while at the Polar region airfield of Luostari there was one squadron of Luftwaffe destroyers (in total 10 faultless "Messerschmitts”). Beside this, one squadron of German bombers (not more than 12 aircrafts) from aircraft group Kgr-806, based in Eastern Prussia, landed several times for refueling at Finnish airfields Utti and Malmi (South Finland).

           Active military actions of Soviet and German aviation began from the very first days of war (i.e. already on June 22-23), but not above Leningrad, rather in Polar region, near Kirkenes, Petsamo, Murmansk, Rybachiy peninsula. Both parties of the war conducted military actions, trampling state borders of Finland. Soviet bombers stroke military objects on the territory of Norway, occupied by Germans, while German aircrafts bombed Main base of North fleet near Murmansk, attacked Soviet ships in Barents Sea, did air surveillance near Murmansk and Kandalakshi.

           All operation flights of Luftwaffe in Polar region were done exclusively from airfields situation on the territory of Norway (Hebukten and Banak). German destroyers redeployed to Finnish airfield Luostari only by June 24-25 and up until the start of Wehrmacht’s land troops attack on Murmansk they didn’t participate in military actions (except for repulsing attacks of Soviet AF on the airfield Luostari). Bombers (long-distance bombers Ju-88 and dive bombers Ju-87) continued to stay on large Norwegian airfields of Hebukten and Banak during the first weeks of German offensive, and only much later, after land troops moving to the East, they started using airfields in Luostari, Alakurtti, Kemiyarvi.

         “German bombers, based in Finland” didn’t make any attacks on Leningrad and cities in Karelia. Neither at first nor at any other days of the war. Based on the very easy reason – they never were located there. During the first days of war 1^st Air fleet of Luftwaffe supported military actions of land troops in Baltic States, being based at airfields in Eastern Prussia. And in what follows, there was no redeployment of German aircraft units to the territory of South and/or Central Finland; moreover, there was no operative sense in it – it was much easier, closer and safer to bomb Leningrad from airfields, based on the territory of occupied Pskov and Novgorod regions (damaged during airstrike bombers didn’t have to fly more than 100 km above the Gulf of Finland). 

         Question about ownership (Soviet or German aviation) of several aircrafts which bombed Hanko peninsula on June 22, needs further clarifications. In any case, Soviet military base, located on almost fully occupied territory of Finland, can’t be treated as “Leningrad and cities in Karelia”.

          During the first two days of war German bombers did undermining of bay of naval base in Kronstadt, while aircrafts (not more than 14 “Junkers”-88 from KGr-806 and Kü.Fl.Gr-506) landed for refueling at Finnish airports of Utti and Malmi. In the general scope of mining installations, done by Germans in the Gulf of Finland (more than 2500 mines of all types), these operations constituted negligibly small part. Air mining was stopped on the second day of war. Most probably because the risk of loosing aircrafts, acting without any destroyer’s support in the zone of powerful AA defense in Leningrad and Kronstadt, was assessed by German command as excessive and, what’s more important, after Germans successfully finished the mining of exits from the Gulf of Finland – not justified at all. Soviet destroyers could and had to prevent the mining of Kronstadt bay from the air. After this didn't happen, any actions, including bombing of airfield in Utti, became examples of what’s called in Russian “close the stable door after the horse has bolted”.  

           Extremely scanty Finnish bombing aviation (23 small two-engined bombers “Blenheim” and SB) didn’t make any airstrikes on Leningrad – not only in June 1941 but even after Finnish army approached the border in 1939, when the front line was 30 km from Leningrad. During the whole period of war Finnish aviation had Mannerheim’s order, which strictly prohibited any flights of Finnish aircrafts over Leningrad. As for surveillance flights which Finnish aviation did in the frontier zone before the official declaration of war, in this case Finnish party just “mirrored” actions of Soviet aviation which was conducting air surveillance of the Finnish territory, trampling the borders during the whole period of “armistice” (March 1940 – June 1941). 

          Destroyer’s grouping of North front and AF of Baltic navy, concentrated near Leningrad and Karelian neck, was one of the most powerful within all Armed forces of USSR. Its number outdid dozens of times the number of German aircrafts (bombers or reconnaissance aircrafts) which at least periodically appeared at airfields in South and Central Finland. Moreover, AA defense in Leningrad had in its system very powerful grouping of anti-aircraft artillery, unmatched one in the whole world (AA defense in London and Berlin didn’t have such number of anti-aircraft guns). System of AA defense in Leningrad was designed to repulse massive airstrikes of the largest European countries (Germany, Great Britain and their possible allies). Accordingly, assumption that two dozens of Finnish and German bombers constituted “deadly threat to Leningrad”, is totally absurd.

         Equally absurd are assumptions that only such extraordinary measures as sudden and treacherous strike on Finnish airfields could “save Leningrad from the fate of cities which were furiously bombed”. Unfortunately, Leningrad was “furiously bombed”. And not once. If it’s permissible to talk about history in conjunctive, then Leningrad could have been saved from this bitter fate, should Wehrmacht's attack in Baltic States have been repulsed, a stable defense created on the border with West Dvina as well as effective actions of destroyers. All this didn’t refer to Finland.

         As for real tasks of airstrike which began in the morning of June 25, then the assumption that it was directed against German aircraft and land forces and had a purpose of “frustrating the airstrike on Leningrad which was under preparation”, could have emerged only based on analysis of orders and directives of Soviet command. Yes, one could read something like this in the orders. But the actual actions of Soviet AF are very difficult to define in the following way:

1.  The only Luftwaffe unit, based on immense spaciousness of South and Central Finland was a flight of reconnaissance aircrafts (two “Dornier” Do-215 and one “Heinkel” He-111) at the airfield Luonetyarvi.

It’s absurd to discuss “threat” which these three aircrafts posed to Leningrad and still, if the goal of operation was the “destruction of German aviation, based at Finnish airfields”, then it was the airfield in Luonetyarvi which should have been target no. 1. But none of Soviet aircrafts have appeared above Luonetyarvi airfield and none of the bombs have fallen on flying field of this airfield.

2. Abstractly reasoning, airstrike on Leningrad could be executed by Finnish bombers – but none of airstrikes on two basic airfields where such bombers were based at (Siikakangas and Luonetyarvi) have been made.

3.  Airfield Utti which German bombers used on June 22-23 for refueling, was included into general list of targets, but none of special remarks on its priority were contained in orders of command of neither 41^st bombers division, nor 2^nd mixed aircraft division. For instance, 2^nd mixed aircraft division, having 142 faultless bombers, had assigned for airstrike on Utti airfield one flight (three aircrafts) from 44^th bombers regiment, which had bombed Utti once from the height of 6,5 km. 41^st bombers division bombed airfields of Valkeala and Utti, having done in total only 12 takeoffs (with regard to the mentioned airfields). It’s hard to call this as an execution of Staff’s Directive dated June 24, which required “destroy enemy’s aviation and airfields by non-stop airstrikes at day and night".

4.  Ports of Gulf of Bothnia (Oulu and Vaasa) which were used to deliver Wehrmacht’s 169^th infantry division to the territory of Finland (and where, probably, were still some units of German forces), were not bombed at all – having in mind that distance from airfields, where long-distance bombers of AF of Baltic navy of Order of Red Banner were based (1^st mining-torpedo aircraft regiment, airfield Bezzabotnoe and 57^th bombers regiment, airfield Kotli), constitutes not more than 600-650 km.  It undoubtedly corresponds to range of long-distance bombers DB-3/DB-3f which were in the ranks of two regiments, mentioned at above, 91 faultless aircrafts in total.

5. If bombing of ports in the Gulf of Bothnia could be considered as a delayed attempt to "catch up with departed train", then destruction of railroad Oulu-Rovaniemi-Salla could lead to the most serious results, since it was used to supply the whole grouping of German forces in Polar region. And still, there were even neither attempts done to solve this task, nor any airstrike done on railroad stations of this main line.

          Let’s turn now to assessment of the course and results of airstrike, made on June 25-26 from different side: which objects were the actual targets of bombers?

          In total there were not less than 12 targets bombed (except for airfields), in particular:

- large railroad stations (Rihimyaki, Kouvola, Luumyaki, Lappeenranta, Mantuharu, Mikkeli, Joensuu)
- main ports of Gulf of Finland (Turku, Salo, Porvoo, Kotka)

- suburbs of Helsinki

         If we now compare this list with pre-war Plan of covering, mobilization and operative deployment of forces of North front (Leningrad district), we will immediately notice obvious similarity of goals and tasks: “Disturb and delay concentration and deployment of enemy’s forces by strong strikes on railroad joint Kouvola, bridges over river Kumin-Ioki and groupings of forces… by living activities of aviation provide dominance in the air and by strong strikes frustrate deliveries for concentration near Jounsuu, Kayaaani, Kuopio…”

          Plan of covering also listed 12 airfields in the South and Central Finland, which should have become the foremost objects for bombing: Kouvola, Kotka, Utti, Sillanpaa, Mikkeli, Porvoo, Lahti, Hollola, Hiitula, Padasjoki, Savonlinna, Hamina.

         Most probably, having received on June 24 the Directive of GHQ Staff, command of AF of North front (as well as command of AF of Baltic navy) have taken from lock boxes the pre-war operative plans and based on them drafted orders to perform “first day-long operation". And in this case one should admit that Staff just didn’t give them time neither for additional reconnaissance, nor for a detailed preparation of the strike itself (interaction with destroyers, optimal choice of ammunition etc). This, however, doesn’t cancel the question, why half of the “enemy’s airfields, identified in advance" didn’t exist at all and, on the contrary, many important airfields (Vesivehmaa, Naarajarvi, Yoronen, Hyvinkaa, Siikakangas, Luonetyarvi) haven’t been put into this list.

          In general, “first day-long operation of Soviet AF" just amazes by its lack of organization and efficiency. Let’s read through once again the description of this operation in the version of major general, professor and doctor of science M.N.Kozhevnikov:

“... Command of AF of North front elaborated and approved on June 24 by Military Soviet of North front a plan of destruction of enemy's aircrafts on airfields in the northwestern direction. More than 540 aircrafts were commissioned in total for this operation.

        Early in the morning on June 25 236 bombers and 224 destroyers made first massive airstrike on 19 airfields. Unaware of such airstrike, enemy was almost caught off guard and couldn’t organize counter actions. As a result, Soviet pilots successfully performed bombing of aircraft parking, depots with fuel and ammunition. 41 enemy’s aircrafts were destroyed on airfields. Our aviation didn’t have any losses.

      In the coming five days these and new airfields identified by reconnaissance aircrafts were effectively bombed several times. According to data of photo control, Soviet pilots, having attacked in total 39 airfields, have done approximately 1000 take offs and have destroyed 130 enemy’s aircrafts. Command of German-fascist forces in Finland and North Norway was forced to retreat its aviation to far home front airfields and refuse for a time being from doing airstrikes on Leningrad…”

         The only truth in this text are the geographic names (Leningrad, Finland, Norway) and the name of the month (June). Everything else in light of real, tragic and shameful facts looks as an example of “grim humor". 

        Operation lasted for straight two days; moreover, on the second day (June 26) bomber units of AF of North front performed just a few reconnaissance flights over Finnish territory. Total number of airfields with real Finnish aviation based on it and which became objects of bombing, equals to five (Turku, Valkeala, Utti, Mikkeli, Joronen). Perhaps, this list should be supplemented with one more airfield, which was named by navigator of 1^st mining-torpedo aircraft regiment as “airfield Lahti” (probably, it was airfield in Hollola). If one should take into account an airfield Luostari in Polar region, then the total number of attacked almost in vain airfields would count seven. Only at one airfield (Turku) a single aircraft was disabled, it’s a strange irony of fate that this aircraft was a trophy Soviet bomber SB. All other “strikes on airfields” were totally unsuccessful and resulted in heavy losses of attackers (9 bombers of 72^nd bombers regiment, shot down during airstrike on airfield Joronen). In two days AF of North front and AF of Baltic navy lost irretrievably 24 bombers. Main airfields where Finnish destroyers were based (Pori, Hyvinkaa, Vesimehvaa, Joronen, Naarajarvi) didn’t suffer at all. There was no “redeployment of enemy’s aviation to far home front airfields”. Completely unreal numbers (“39 airfields”, “130 enemy's aircrafts”) can’t be even approximately connected with any real events…

         Such striking discrepancy between stated goal and results forces us to get back once again to the time when Directive of GHQ Staff was issued on June 24. Where from did the information about German aviation appeared, based on the territory of Finland, especially in considerable amounts? And if the authors of this Directive believed at first in the presence of large forces of German aviation on the territory of Finland, then how could they approve the plan of operation, which provided for bombing of Finnish airfield with “small groups of 3-5 aircrafts", moreover, without support of destroyers? Such tactics resulted in large and completely unjustified losses even in fights with scanty Finnish aviation (armed, by the way, with obsolescent and physically worn destroyers). What would be the outcome, should there be hundreds of the newest “Messerschmidts” at the airfields in South Finland?

         Let’s read through once again the first, recitals part of GHQ Staff’s Directive:

"1. Reliable sources identified that German forces are concentrating on the territory of Finland, for the purpose of striking at Leningrad and occupying Murmansk and Kandalarsha. At present there are up to four infantry divisions concentrated near Rovaniemi, Kemiyarvi and one group of unidentified number near Kotka and north to Hanko peninsula.
       German aviation systematically arrives to the territory of Finland, as well, where from  it makes airstrikes at our territory. According to present data, German command intends to make airstrike at Leningrad.

This  circumstance takes  decisive importance.
2. For the purpose of prevention and frustration of airstrike at Leningrad, planned by German command in Finland, I ORDER…”

         It’s hard not to notice the obvious contradictoriness in this text: Unnamed “reliable sources” identified that there are German forces of “unidentified number”, concentrated on the territory of South Finland.

If the number of grouping is not identified at least approximately, and the area where it’s deployed identified “accurate within” 200 km (from Hanko to Kotka), then what was the essence of “credibility” of this mysterious “sources”? It’s important to mention as well the rather strange initial area of grouping’s deployment, which presumably “is preparing to strike at Leningrad”. How can one get from the line of North coast of Gulf of Finland to Leningrad? Conduct amphibious landing operation with support of two ill-fated battle-ships? Or wait until the gulf would be covered with strong ice?

         From another side, number of real grouping of German forces in Polar region is identified pretty precisely ("up to four infantry divisions"). Practically, there were two mountain rifle divisions, deployed near Petsamo, while only one infantry division (169^th infantry division) and motorized brigade of SS “Nord” near Kemiyarvi-Salla. The task, set by German command to these formations, is identified completely precisely (“occupy Murmansk and Kandalaksha”). We should mention in brackets, that it’s not a trivial conclusion at all. Even though these two toponyms (Murmansk and Kandalaksha) are present in one line in the majority of books dedicated to war in Polar region, in reality these two cities are divided by line of unpopulated rocky desert 200 km wide. Seizure of Murmansk and Kandalakshi is not one and the same, but rather two independent operations, in the course of which forces of two combat groupings wouldn't have "shoulder-to-shoulder” connection. German command hesitated for a long time in reasonability of conducting simultaneously these two operations, while military historians argue this up until nowadays.

         Mistake in identifying the concentration area of German forces (“up to four infantry divisions concentrated near Rovaniemi, Kemiyarvi”) at least is understandable. Until morning of June 22 German forces (169^th infantry division and brigade of SS "Nord”) were really based only in the area of Rovaniemi-Kemiyarvi. Grouping aimed at seizure of Murmansk (2^nd and 3^rd mountain rifle divisions) crossed the Norway-Finland border near Kirkenes-Petsamo only on June 22. That fact that Moscow didn't know this on June 24, is a blunder, even though pretty understandable, since supreme command was unable to get and assess the new reconnaissance information so fast.         

         As for grouping of forces of probable enemy at the front of 23^rd Army (on the North of Karelian neck), it was identified by armed reconnaissance of North front (Leningrad military district) pretty close to reality. Practically, there were no German forces in South Finland, while in stripe from the coast of Gulf of Finland to station Parikkala there were concentrated seven infantry divisions (after finishing mobilization and operative deployment of Finnish army, i.e. in the beginning of June 1941): 2nd army corps within 2^nd infantry division, 15^th infantry division, 18^th infantry division, 4^th army corps and 10 infantry division, being in reserve of command (see

 Map № 13). Beside this, in the area to the North from Hanko peninsula a 17^th infantry division was deployed.

        Let’s now look at the documents of 23^rd Army and 10 mechcorps. Battle order № 01 ( 16:30 June 23) of Staff of 23^rd Army describes the number of enemy in the following way: “Enemy (Finnish and German armies) is grouped on the territory of Finland, up to 1 infantry division at Petrozavodsk (i.e. on the stripe of neighboring 7^th Army - M.S.) and up to 7 infantry divisions at Vyborg directions. ( 306 ). Number of enemy, as we see, is identified totally right; mistake is done only in assumption of the presence of German forces in this direction. By the end of June (i.e. already after announcing Directive of GHQ Staff as of June 24) there are more mistakes in reconnaissance data:

- intelligence summary № 9 of 23^rd Army (5:00 am, June 27) states presence of non-existing in reality "tank regiment near Imatra-Jakola" ( 307 )

- Final intelligence summary of Staff of 10^th mechcorps for June 22-29: “By June 28 concentration of Finnish forces near our borders was in principle finished. All types of reconnaissance identified that there are at least nine infantry divisions with tanks, motorized infantry and motorcycle units, concentrated near the front of 23^rd Army. There are identified German small and middle-range tanks. Heavy tanks are also assumed…”(308 ) 

         So, rumors about German tanks are intensifying, number of infantry divisions in Finnish army is overstated 29% from real figures (9 instead of 7). As we can see, there are mistakes in intelligence data, but for a few per cent, not in times at all.

And in any event there are no reasons to assume that military intelligence of North front didn't understand at all the situation beyond the border.

        As for number and positioning of German aviation in Finland, the notorious Directive of GHQ Staff doesn’t say anything specific at all (“German aviation also systematically arrives to the territory of Finland”). Where to? How many of it? One could only guess why this vague “arrival” received all of a sudden a “decisive importance”. The only specific data (while still being fantastic) is found just in one of records in “Chronicles of war at the North theater” (compiled in the 1944-1945 based on War diary and other documents from the Staff of North front). Record dated June 27 (i.e. after the GHQ Staff’s Directive) shows such information: “According to military intelligence data of Northwest front (as in original – M.S.) the total number of German aviation in the North part of Norway reached 400 aircrafts, in Finland – 600 aircrafts”. ( 224 ) 

         Northwest front (i.e. former Baltic military district) didn’t have any relation to North Norway. Most probably authors of this document got mistaken and it was North front in reality (i.e. former Leningrad military district). However, documents from staff of North front don’t mention any “600 German aircrafts in Finland”. Number of German aircrafts is traced continuously only in surveillance summary reports of Staff of 1^st mixed aircraft division (Murmansk) Aircrafts, according to these summary reports, are based in the real place of the positioning, i.e. in Norway. It’s quantity is established very close to reality:

         - Surveillance summary report № 4 (19:00, June 23)

“item 2: Aircraft park is established at the following airfields:

Hebukten – up to 50 aircrafts, Banak – up to 32, Tromse - up to 30, Narvik – up to 20, Bode (Bude) – up to 11, Tronheim – up to 45” ( 309 )  

          Surveillance summary report № 10 (23:00, June 26)

“at 18:10 8-10 bombers are masked at the airfield in Luostari and 6-8 destroyers; up to 12 aircrafts were based at the airfield in Rovaniemi” ( 310 )

            Comparison of these summary reports with real state of the case as it’s known nowadays, shows us that total number of aircrafts of the 5^th Luftwaffe’s air fleet in Norway was considerably understated (188 instead of approximately 280), while number of aircrafts of “Kirkenes formation” (at the airfields of Hebukten and Banak) is identified almost precisely. In other words, intelligence service of 1^st mixed aircraft division had very vague idea with regard to quantity of German aviation in the far South of Finland (i.e. thousands of kilometers from Murmansk), while its own enemy was identified very precisely. Summary report as of June 26 overstated number of aircrafts at the Finnish airfield Luostari very much, but in general surveillance data is pretty close to real figures.

            Somewhat similar picture is contained in the documents of Staff of North fleet (is cited based on “Chronicles”; airfield in Kirkenes for uniformity of the whole text will be called as Hebukten, airfield Lakselven – as Banak):

            - Record as of June 24: “According to radio surveillance data of North front there were based 62 aircrafts in Hebukten, including 11 “Ju-87”, 7 “Hs-126”, 11 "Me-110” and “Me-109”, 3 “Courier”, 6 “Schtorh”, 4 “Ju-52” (in total 42, others, most probably, were identified as civil ones – M.S.), at the airfield Banak - 30 aircrafts, including unidentified number of “He-111”, in Tromse – up to 20 aircrafts

            - Record as of June 26: “According to radio surveillance data of North front, enemy’s aviation was positioned at: In Hebukten – 23 bombers, 12 reconnaissance aircrafts, 6 destroyers and 6 transport aircrafts; in Banak - 7 bombers, 2 destroyers and 7 transport aircrafts; in Tromse – 17 aircrafts, in Bude – 12 aircrafts, in Narvihe – 18 aircrafts and in Tronheim – 34 aircrafts ”Ju-87”. ( 224 ) .

          Number and types of Luftwaffe combat aircrafts at the airfields of Hebukten and Banak are identified pretty likely (practically, there were 54 bombers and long-distance surveillance aircrafts, 26 destroyers Bf-109 and Me-110). In any case, neither “400 aircrafts in the Northern part of Norway”, nor “600 aircrafts in Finland” are present in surveillance summary reports, coming from Murmansk.

          Conclusion which could be drawn based on all these documents, suggests that “reliable sources”, whose messages were used as a basis for mysterious GHQ Staff’s Directive as of June 24, were located somewhere very far away from Leningrad and Murmansk, from Staffs of North front and North fleet. Simply speaking – “reliable sources” were located in Moscow. Neither command of North front nor command of North fleet fix concentration of non-existing in reality land and aircraft units of the enemy, don’t prepare to repulse mythic attacks itself, without instructions from Moscow. Supreme command, on contrary, shows obvious unsuitability for the occupation. The most important decision is approved in haste, possible political consequences are not assessed even “one step ahead”, surveillance is substituted by collection of rumors, operation is prepared and conducted reckoning the blind good luck and results eventually in a costly failure.

          Here we could have finished discussion of reasons which induced Staff of General Headquarters (i.e. comrade Stalin and his special authorized advisors) to approve on June 24, 1941 decision with regard to airstrike on Finland. If another circumstance wouldn’t take place. At the same time in Moscow was arrested and immediately put into torture basement Deputy of people’s commissar of defense of USSR, authorized representative of Staff in North front, former Chief of General Staff of workers’ and peasant’ Red Army, general of the army K.A.Meretskov. Those interested can look through it in the following Chapter.